Reciprocal organization of the cerebral hemispheres by McGilchrist, Iain
he fact that the brain, an organ which exists
precisely to make connections, has a deeply divided
structure has remained largely unexplained and even
unexamined. Nevertheless, speculation on the nature of
the difference between the two cerebral hemispheres
goes back more than two millennia: Greek physicians
in the third century BC held that the right hemisphere
was specialized for perception, and the left hemisphere
for understanding.
1 In more recent times, Wigan in 1844
deduced from a series of clinical cases that we ‘must
have two minds with two brains,’ a redundancy which
he thought protected against injury to one or other
hemisphere, but with mental illness being the cost to
the individual when they were in conflict.
2 In the later
19th, and particularly in the 20th, century following the
first callosotomy procedures of Sperry and Bogen,
there arose a plethora of theories about the different
functions the two hemispheres might perform, which
broadly distinguished a verbal, rational, analytic left
hemisphere from a visuospatially orientated, emotional,
and holistic right hemisphere, though the evolutionary
origin and basis of their anatomical and functional sep-
aration remained obscure.
3 Subsequent research has in
any case revealed that each hemisphere contributes to
language, visuospatial skills, reason, and emotion,
indeed to virtually every cerebral function, suggesting
that the bihemispheric structure of the brain is an
anomaly. At the same time, the persistence in popular
Clinical research
T
Reciprocal organization of the 
cerebral hemispheres
Iain McGilchrist, MA (Oxon), BM, FRCPsych
Keywords: brain; hemisphere; asymmetry; corpus callosum; attention; inhibition
Author affiliations: Quondam Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, UK;
Consultant Psychiatrist Emeritus, Bethlem Royal & Maudsley Hospital, London,
UK
Address for correspondence: Iain McGilchrist, c/o All Souls College, Oxford OX1 4AL,
UK  
(e-mail: iain.mcgilchrist@all-souls.ox.ac.uk) 
The cerebral hemispheres are anatomically and neu-
rophysiologically asymmetrical. The evolutionary basis
for these differences remains uncertain. There are,
however, highly consistent differences between the
hemispheres, evident in reptiles, birds, and mammals,
as well as in humans, in the nature of the attention
each applies to the environment. This permits the
simultaneous application of precisely focused, but nar-
row, attention, needed for grasping food or prey, with
broad, open, and uncommitted attention, needed to
watch out for predators and to interpret the intentions
of conspecifics. These different modes of attention can
account for a very wide range of repeated observa-
tions relating to hemisphere specialization, and sug-
gest that hemisphere differences lie not in discrete
functional domains as such, but distinct modes of func-
tioning within any one domain. These modes of atten-
tion are mutually incompatible, and their application
depends on inhibitory transmission in the corpus cal-
losum. There is also an asymmetry of interaction
between the hemispheres at the phenomenological
level.  
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difference has meant that the topic has somewhat
fallen into disrepute. 
Yet many important authors in the field (eg, Hellige,
4
Ramachandran,
5 Crow,
6 Cutting
7,8) accept that there is
something manifestly important here that requires expla-
nation. Hellige, while emphasizing that ‘in the intact brain,
it is rarely the case that one hemisphere can perform a
task normally whereas the other hemisphere is com-
pletely unable to perform the task at all,’ notes that ‘the
range of tasks showing hemispheric asymmetry is quite
broad’ and that ‘thus far, it has not been possible to iden-
tify any single information-processing dichotomy that
could account for anything close to this entire range of
hemispheric asymmetries... Whatever links there might be
between the various hemispheric asymmetries, they would
seem to be determined in some other way or according to
some other principle.’
4What might that principle be?
Brain asymmetries exist at 
many levels of description
The fact that hemispheric asymmetries exist at every
level of description suggests that the interhemispheric
distribution of neuropsychological functions is unlikely
to be random. Such asymmetries exist at the gross
anatomical level in the size, weight, and conformation of
either hemisphere as a whole,
9,10 but as well as differing
in the size and shape of a number of defined brain
areas,
11 the hemispheres differ in the number of neu-
rones,
12 neuronal size,
13 and the extent of dendritic
branching within areas.
14,15The ratio of white to gray mat-
ter also differs, being higher in the right hemisphere.
16,17
Neurochemically the hemispheres differ in their sensi-
tivity to hormones
18 and to pharmacological agents,
19 and
there are significant differences in the ratio of dopamin-
ergic to noradrenergic neurotransmission.
20,21
Functional independence of the 
hemispheres increases with evolution
Furthermore, the corpus callosum appears to be pri-
marily involved in maintaining functional independence
of the hemispheres. Though it contains an estimated 300
to 800 million fibers connecting topologically similar
areas in either hemisphere, only 2% of cortical neurons
are connected via the corpus callosum.
22,23What is more,
a large number of these connections are functionally
inhibitory.
24,25 Significant populations of cells projecting
to the corpus callosum are GABA-ergic, and although
the majority are glutamatergic, the excitatory fibers
often terminate on interneurons whose function is
inhibitory.
26,27 Stimulation of neurons in one hemisphere
commonly results in an initial brief excitatory response,
followed by a prolonged and often widespread inhibi-
tion in the contralateral hemisphere.
28,29 Clearly the cor-
pus callosum does also have excitatory functions, and
both are necessary for normal human functioning,
24,30 but
the primary function of the corpus callosum may in fact
be to allow reciprocal hemispheric inhibition.
31-33
Separation of hemispheric function appears to acceler-
ate with evolution, since interhemispheric connections
decrease relative both to brain size,
22 and to the degree
of brain asymmetry.
34 In the ultimate case of H. sapiens,
the twin hemispheres have been characterized as two
autonomous systems.
35
Attentional asymmetry in birds and animals
Functional brain asymmetries exist also in birds and ani-
mals. Lateralization of function is widespread in verte-
brates,
36 and appears to have evolutionary advantages.
For example, Braun writes that ‘the vast database of ani-
mal research [and] human neuropsychiatric research …
both clearly establish numerous important and spectac-
ular specializations of the right hemisphere,’ as well as
of the left.
37
It is argued here that these apparent specializations
relate to differences in the mode of attention. Animals
and birds experience competing needs. This can be seen
at one level in terms of the types of attention they are
required to bring to bear on the world. There is a need
to focus attention narrowly and with precision, as a bird,
for example, needs to focus on a grain of corn in order
to distinguish it from the pieces of grit on which it lies.
At the same time there is a need for open attention, as
wide as possible, to guard against a possible predator.
Chicks achieve this by prioritizing local information with
the right eye (left hemisphere), and global information
with the left eye (right hemisphere). Chicks that are
properly lateralized are more able to use these two types
of attention effectively than are those in which, experi-
mentally, lateralization has not been permitted to
develop (by depriving them of light exposure on day 19
of incubation).
38 For many species of birds and animals
there are biases at the population level towards watch-
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38-46 Equally fixat-
ing an object, especially prey or food, is preferentially
carried out using the right eye and foot.
47
Individual animals with more strongly lateralized brains
are better able, because of hemisphere specialization, to
forage and remain aware of predators,
48 and are more
efficient,
49 with shorter reaction times.
50 But advantages
accrue not only to the individual: being a more lateral-
ized species at the population level carries advantages in
social cohesion.
51-53The right hemisphere appears to be
deeply involved in social functioning, not just in pri-
mates, where it is specialized in the expression of social
feelings, but in lower animals and birds as well.
38,39,54-56
Toads, for example, attend to their prey with the left
hemisphere, but interact with their fellow toads using the
right hemisphere,
57 and while black-winged stilts peck
more, and more successfully, at prey using the right eye,
males are more likely to direct courtship displays to
females that are seen with their left eye.
55 In most animal
species, intense emotional responses are related to the
right hemisphere and inhibited by the left.
61 Some of the
same neuroendocrine hemisphere differences that char-
acterize the human brain are already present in the
brains of rats
58,59: this may be related to the fact that in
rats, as in humans, the right hemisphere is the main locus
of early social experience.
60
Lateralization brings evolutionary advantages, particu-
larly in carrying out dual-attention tasks.
41 In general
terms, the left hemisphere yields narrow, focused atten-
tion, mainly for the purpose of getting and feeding. The
right hemisphere yields a broad, vigilant attention, the
purpose of which appears to be awareness of signals
from the surroundings, especially of other creatures, who
are potential predators or potential mates, foes, or
friends; and it is involved in bonding in social animals.
Individual human brains, like animal brains, that are less
lateralized (as defined by handedness) than the norm
appear to show global deficits. In humans this applies
across all forms of reasoning, verbal and nonverbal.
62 In
a word, asymmetry pays.
63
Attentional asymmetry in humans
This relationship between mode of attention and later-
alization in animals also pertains in humans. It is con-
ventional to distinguish five types of attention: vigilance,
sustained attention, and alertness, forming the intensity
axis, and focused attention and divided attention, form-
ing the selectivity axis of attention.
64 The different types
of attention can be demonstrated to be distinct and inde-
pendent of one another, and subserved by a number of
different brain structures distributed extensively over
the prefrontal, anterior cingulate, and posterior parietal
areas of both hemispheric cortices. Within either hemi-
sphere, and between hemispheres, the system of control
processes is complex. However, some broad consistent
differences in hemisphere specialization are striking.
Vigilance and sustained attention are grossly impaired
in subjects with right-hemisphere lesions,
65-67 especially
right frontal lesions,
68 and by contrast, are preserved in
left-hemisphere lesions.
69 Right-hemisphere lesions also
lead to perceptuomotor slowing, a sign of diminished
alertness, associated with lapses of attention,
70-76 though
in one study slowing was associated with lesions in the
left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
77 Studies in both nor-
mal subjects
78,79 and split-brain subjects
80 corroborate the
role of the right hemisphere in the “intensity” aspects of
attention, confirmed by neuroimaging.
81,82
The other main axis of attention is selectivity (focused
and divided attention). Although selective attention may
be bilateral,
83 deficits in focused attention are more
severe with left-hemisphere injury,
76,85 typically in the left
caudate,
77 or left anterior cingulate.
84 Normal subjects
show a left-hemisphere preference for choice reac-
tions,
86,87 and imaging suggests focused attention is asso-
ciated with activity in the left orbitofrontal cortex and
basal ganglia.
88 By contrast, lesions in the right inferior
parietal lobule cause the most serious impairment of
global attention.
89
As regards divided attention, the evidence is less con-
clusive. While some studies suggest that both left and
right hemispheres are involved,
77 there appears to be a
clear primary role for the right hemisphere, especially
the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
88,90
In summary, there is evidence of left-hemisphere domi-
nance for local, narrowly focussed attention and right-
hemisphere dominance for broad, sustained, global, and
flexible attention.
65,66,91-95 The scope of the right hemi-
sphere’s world is broad.
96-97 Subjects with a right-hemi-
sphere lesion start with the pieces and put them together
to get the overall picture, whereas those with a left-hemi-
sphere lesion prefer a global approach.
98-102 Right-hemi-
sphere damaged subjects seem unable to adjust the
breadth of the “spotlight” of their attention and suffer
‘an excessive and more or less permanent narrowing of
their attentional window.’
103
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many consequences for the phenomenological world
which each construes, potentially accounting for a range
of apparent functional specializations of either hemi-
sphere. These specializations, which the author has
described in detail and discussed at length elsewhere,
104
offer perceptual advantages that are reciprocally related,
and are summarized in the following section. 
Some consequences for 
hemispheric specialization
The above distinction in attention could be seen as offer-
ing the reciprocal possibilities of breadth and flexibility
in apprehending the unpredictable and (as yet)
unknown, versus the focus and precision required to
grasp and use what is familiar and has already been pri-
oritized as of interest. 
The new versus the known 
The right hemisphere alone attends to the peripheral
field of vision from which new experience tends to come;
only the right hemisphere can direct attention to what
comes to us from the edges of our awareness, regardless
of side.
105,106 Anything newly entering our experiential
world instantly triggers release of noradrenaline, mainly
in the right hemisphere.
96,107 Novel experience induces
changes in the right hippocampus, but not the left.
108
Phenomenologically it is the right hemisphere that is
attuned to the apprehension of anything new.
38,107,109-118
This difference is pervasive across domains. Not just new
experience, but the learning of new information or new
skills also engages right-hemisphere attention more than
left,
119,120 even if the information is verbal in nature.
121,122
However, once the skills have become familiar through
practice, they shift to being the concern of the left hemi-
sphere,
107 even for skills such as playing a musical instru-
ment.
123
The left hemisphere prioritizes the expected, and its
process is predictive.
124,125This makes it more efficient in
routine situations, but less efficient wherever the initial
assumptions have to be revised,
126,127 or when there is a
need to distinguish old information from new material
that may be consistent with it.
128 Because the left hemi-
sphere is drawn by its expectations, the right hemisphere
outperforms the left whenever prediction is difficult
because the situation is new to the subject.
129 The link
between the right hemisphere and what is new or emo-
tionally engaging exists not just in humans, but already in
higher mammals: for example, horses perceive new and
possibly emotionally arousing stimuli with the left eye.
130
Possibility versus predictability 
The right hemisphere is more capable of a frame shift;
131-133
the right frontal lobe is especially important for flexibility
of thought, with damage in that area leading to persever-
ation.
134-136 In problem solving, the right hemisphere pre-
sents an array of possible solutions, which remain “live”
while alternatives are explored;
137,138 the left hemisphere
takes the single solution that seems best to fit what it
already knows and latches onto it.
21,139 Ramachandran’s
studies of anosognosia reveal a tendency for the left hemi-
sphere to deny discrepancies that do not fit its already gen-
erated schema of things, a strategy that works well in famil-
iar situations in which there are time-costs to exploring
unnecessary possibilities. The right hemisphere, by con-
trast, is actively watching for discrepancies, more like a
devil’s advocate.
140 Both approaches are needed, but are
mutually contradictory. 
These differences operate across all realms and apply
equally to the verbal as to the visuospatial. For example,
the left hemisphere operates focally, suppressing verbal
meanings that are not currently relevant, whereas the right
hemisphere recruits wider semantic associations,
141-145 and
the right posterior superior temporal sulcus may be selec-
tively involved in verbal creativity.
146 In the “close” situa-
tion, by contrast, the left hemisphere actively suppresses
the right, to exclude associations which are semantically
only distantly related.
147,148
Integration versus division
In general the left hemisphere is more closely intercon-
nected within itself, and within regions of itself, than the
right hemisphere.
14,17 By contrast, the right hemisphere
has a greater degree of myelination, facilitating swift
transfer of information between the cortex and centers
below the cortex,
17 and greater connectivity in general.
149
Functionally, its superior integration is evidenced by
EEG measures
150 and by the more diffuse but overlap-
ping somatosensory projections and auditory inputs in
the right hemisphere.
151
At the experiential level it is also better able to integrate
perceptual processes, particularly bringing together dif-
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109,154,155
By contrast, the left hemisphere may be ‘inadequate for
the more rapid complex syntheses achieved by the
[right] hemisphere.’
156
As mentioned, new stimuli lead to release of noradren-
alin in the right hemisphere. Its neurons are relatively
resistant to fatigue, so that exploratory attention is held
open across a greater expanse of both space and time.
21
The range of the right hemisphere is further increased
by the fact that it has a longer working memory, and so
is able both to access more information and hold it
together at any one time for longer.
157 It is capable of
bearing more information in mind and doing so over
longer periods, with greater specificity (which also means
less susceptibility to degradation over time by mem-
ory).
128,157-159This broader field of attention, open to what-
ever may be, and coupled with greater integration over
time and space, is what makes possible the recognition
of broad or complex patterns, the perception of the
“thing as a whole,” seeing the wood for the trees.
160-163 In
short, the left hemisphere takes a local short-term view,
where the right hemisphere sees the bigger picture. 
The whole versus the part 
The link between the right hemisphere and holistic or
Gestalt perception is one of the most reliable and
durable of the generalizations about hemisphere differ-
ences, which follows from the differences in the nature
of attention.
95,164-168The right hemisphere sees the whole,
before whatever it is gets broken up into parts in our
attempt to know it, and its holistic processing is not
based on summation of parts. The right hemisphere, with
its greater integrative power, is constantly searching for
patterns in things, and its understanding is based on
complex pattern recognition.
164-169 On the other hand, the
left hemisphere sees part-objects.
118,170-172
Subjects with unilateral brain damage show comple-
mentary deficits in drawing skills, depending on whether
it is right or left hemisphere function that is compro-
mised. The productions of those with right-hemisphere
damage, relying on their left hemisphere, lose overall
coherence and integrity, and become so distorted they
are barely recognizable: there is no grasp of the Gestalt.
The drawings of those with left-hemisphere damage, by
contrast, relying on their right hemisphere, exhibit rel-
ative poverty of detail, because the accent is on the
shape of the whole.
173,174
Context versus abstraction 
For the same reason that the right hemisphere sees
things as a whole, it also sees each thing in its context, as
standing in a qualifying relationship with all that sur-
rounds it, rather than taking it as a single isolated
entity.
129,175-176 Whatever is not explicit or literal, that
requires contextual understanding, depends on the right
frontal lobe for its meaning to be conveyed or
received.
176The right hemisphere understands from indi-
rect contextual clues, not only from explicit statement,
whereas the left hemisphere will identify by concepts
rather than from the experiential context (eg, identifies
that it must be winter because it is “January,” not by
looking at the trees).
177,178
This difference is particularly important when it comes
to language. Whereas the left hemisphere has more
sophisticated syntax and a greater semantic range, the
right hemisphere takes whatever is said within its entire
context.
179 It is specialized in pragmatics, the art of con-
textual understanding of meaning, and in using
metaphor.
180,181 The right temporal region appears to be
essential for the integration of two seemingly unrelated
concepts into a meaningful metaphoric expression.
182All
conceptual thought is ultimately metaphorical in
nature.
183 The left hemisphere, because its thinking is
decontextualized, tends towards a relatively inflexible
following of the internal logic of the situation, even if
this is in contravention of everything experience tells
us.
184
Individuals versus categories
At the same time it is the right hemisphere that stores
details to distinguish specific instances.
185The right hemi-
sphere presents individual, unique instances of things and
individual, familiar, objects, where the left hemisphere re-
presents categories of things, and generic, nonspecific
objects.
118,186-187 In keeping with this, the right hemisphere
uses unique referents, where the left hemisphere uses
non-unique referents.
118,119,188-190 It is with the right hemi-
sphere that we distinguish individuals of all kinds, places
as well as faces.
191 In fact it is precisely its capacity for
holistic processing that enables the right hemisphere to
recognize individuals, since individuals are Gestalt, indi-
visible, wholes.
159,186,192 In keeping with the principle that it
is not what is done, but how it is done, that distinguishes
the two hemispheres, one cannot say that one hemi-
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with “aggregates.” Both deal with “units” and both deal
with “aggregates.” Thus, the right sees individual entities
(its kind of units) in all their uniqueness, and it sees them
as belonging in a contextual whole (its kind of aggregate),
from which they are not divided. By contrast the left sees
parts (its kind of units), which go to make up a something
which it recognizes by the category to which it belongs
(its kind of aggregate). However, the relationship
between the smaller unit and the broader aggregate in
either case is profoundly different: as is the mode of
attention to the world with which it is associated.
Where the left hemisphere is more concerned with
abstract categories and types, the right hemisphere is
more concerned with the uniqueness and individuality
of each entity.
189,193,194The right hemisphere’s role as what
Ramachandran has described as the“anomaly detector”
might in fact be seen rather as an aspect of its preference
for things as they actually exist (which are never entirely
static or congruent—always changing, never the same)
over abstract representation, in which things become
fixed and equivalent, types rather than individuals.
Where the left hemisphere utilizes abstract categories,
the right hemisphere organizes experience according to
specific exemplars.
195-198 The left hemisphere takes an
invariant or abstracted view in its representation of
objects, where the right hemisphere uses stored “real
world” views in order to group experience.
195,199-200
The living versus the nonliving
The left hemisphere has more capacity for the abstract
or impersonal, whereas, in keeping with its more con-
textualized view, the right hemisphere is less prone to
abstraction, and prioritizes the personal.
201,202
The left hemisphere is better at appreciating analytic or
mechanical structures, whereas the right hemisphere is
better adapted to an appreciation of wholes, such as liv-
ing entities, that have not been put together from parts.
The right hemisphere is more concerned with living indi-
viduals than manmade objects.
203 The left hemisphere
alone codes for nonliving things,
204-207 while both hemi-
spheres code for living things.
206-208 However, at least one
study has found a clean divide between the hemispheres,
the left coding for the nonliving, and the right for the liv-
ing, regardless of the task.
209The body image as a whole
is a right-hemisphere entity, whereas body parts are the
province of the left hemisphere.
210
The left hemisphere codes for tools and machines.
118,204-
206,208,209 Right-hemisphere damage leaves the ability to use
simple tools unaltered, whereas left-hemisphere damage
renders the sufferer incapable of using a hammer and
nail, or a key and a padlock. However, right-hemisphere
damage particularly impairs naturalistic actions involv-
ing a sequence of steps, for example making a cup of cof-
fee or wrapping a present.
211-212
Corballis writes that ‘there is a case for supposing that
the left side represents the fruits of human invention,
including language, manufacture, and a partwise way of
representing objects.’
213 He draws attention to the affin-
ity of the left hemisphere for everything it has itself
made. The right temporal region, by contrast, appears to
have areas not only specific for living things, but addi-
tionally for all that is specifically human.
214-216 Such judg-
ments of “humanness” are separate from the right hemi-
sphere’s superior ability to recognize faces.
217
The need to reconcile irreconcilables
The narrow focus of attention of the left hemisphere
predisposes it to adopt a part-wise representation of
reality, which promotes the transformation of a contin-
uous process into a series of static points. This may
underlie the different contributions made by each hemi-
sphere to the appreciation of music and the sense of
time, as well as to spatial depth.
104
The broader scope of attention of the right hemisphere,
which sees the individual in relation to others—in ani-
mals and birds, to predator or conspecific—leads to its
prominent role in social understanding in humans,
including in “theory of mind,” and the expression of, and
receptivity towards, social emotions. Decety and
Chaminade note that ‘self-awareness, empathy, identi-
fication with others, and more generally inter-subjective
processes, are largely dependent upon … right hemi-
sphere resources.’
218These issues, which also have impli-
cations for the moral sense and the sense of the self, are
complex and are explored at length elsewhere.
104
Overall, there is the requirement, on the one hand, for a
highly focused form of attention, directed towards an
object that is already known, and which must be
resolved precisely if it is to be grasped or used. This
includes food or prey, but also anything that is to be used
or manipulated. This is mediated by the left hemisphere,
and crows already exhibit a strong right eye bias for tool
manufacture, even where using the right eye makes the
Clinical research
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219,220 In man the left hemisphere is
also the controller of the grasping right hand, and of the
denotative and explicit (rather than connotative or
implicit) aspects of language whereby we make meaning
precise, or as we say “grasp” it (cf French com-prendre,
German be-greifen). On the other hand, this narrowly
focused kind of attention is disruptive of continuity and
context, and there is a need for an attention of broader
scope, mediated by the right hemisphere, that is not dis-
tinct, precise, and manipulative, but reciprocal, more tol-
erant of uncertainty and ambiguity, and intersubjective
in nature. 
The difference can be seen at its simplest in processing
visual imagery. Blurred or indistinct images are easily
processed by the right hemisphere, but not by the left,
even where the nature of the task would suggest that it
should be more problematic for the right hemisphere.
221
One of the most consistent early findings in hemi-
sphere specialization was that whenever an image is
either only fleetingly presented, or presented in a
degraded form, so that only partial information is 
available, a right-hemisphere superiority emerges.
221-223
Sergent was able to demonstrate that this is the case
even when the material is verbal, and its converse,
namely that when images are presented for longer than
usual, thus increasing their certainty and familiarity, a
left-hemisphere superiority emerges, even in face
recognition.
224 According to Sergent, letters of the
alphabet ‘represent a finite set of stimuli that are
sharply focused, familiar and overlearned,’ whereas
visual images ‘represent a potentially infinite set of
shapes of large visual angle size, with different levels of
structure of unequal importance and salience that are
most often unfamiliar to subjects.’ Here a common
thread unites, on the one hand, the left hemisphere’s
affinity for what it itself has made (here language),
familiarity, certainty and finitude, and, on the other, the
right hemisphere’s affinity for all that is new, unknown,
uncertain, and unbounded.
93
The nature of interhemispheric relations
Given the difference in concerns, how are the relationships
between the two hemispheres managed in practice? 
The experience of callosotomy is instructive. Behavioral
disturbances following callosotomy take the form not, as
might have been expected, of loss of function, but, on the
contrary, of failures of functional inhibition. In this
respect, split-brain subjects are like patients who have
suffered a stroke or other neurological injury affecting
the corpus callosum: there is a problem of compromised
interhemispheric inhibition.
225-226
The inhibitory nature of the corpus callosum is adaptive
and creative, rather than restrictive, and the ability to
maintain separation while communicating information
is essential. Banich notes that:
the major finding to come out of our laboratory since the
mid-1980s is that interhemispheric interaction is much
more than just a mechanism by which one hemisphere
“photocopies” experiences and feelings for its partner.
Interhemispheric interaction has important emergent func-
tions—functions that cannot be derived from the simple
sum of its parts … the nature of processing when both
hemispheres are involved cannot be predicted from the
parts.
23
One of the many misconceptions of the popular culture
surrounding hemisphere difference is that creativity is a
function of the right hemisphere alone. Certainly there
is plenty of evidence that the right hemisphere is impor-
tant for creativity,
227 which, given its ability to make more
and wider-ranging connections, and to think more flexi-
bly, is hardly surprising.
228 But this is only part of the
story. Both hemispheres are importantly involved.
Creativity depends on the union of things that are also
maintained separately—the precise function of the cor-
pus callosum, both to separate and connect. Division of
the corpus callosum does in fact impair creativity in indi-
viduals.
229
Asymmetry of interhemispheric inhibition
Interhemispheric competition is differently regulated in
different individuals. For certain tasks, one or other
hemisphere generally tends to predominate, its partic-
ular cognitive and perceptual style as a whole being
more suited to the task in question, but interindividual
differences exist, with characteristic and consistent biases
associated with differing degrees of arousal and activa-
tion in either hemisphere. This phenomenon is known as
“hemispheric utilization bias” or “characteristic percep-
tual asymmetry.” 
230-233
Through examining these perceptual asymmetries, the
relationship between the hemispheres can be seen to be
itself asymmetrical. For example, in experiments where
a task is carried out requiring attention to the nonfa-
vored visual field (the field contralateral to the nonfa-
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mation is presented to the favored visual field, those sub-
jects with a characteristic left-hemisphere bias found
that the already strong tendency for the left hemisphere
to prioritize the right visual field, and downplay the left
visual field, was enhanced. This meant that the irrelevant
information in the right field interfered with the task
going on in the left field (controlled by the right hemi-
sphere). But for those with a characteristic right-hemi-
sphere bias, when conditions were reversed, no such
competitive effects were seen: irrelevant information in
the right hemisphere’s favored left field did not interfere
with the subject’s ability to attend to the matter in hand
going on, now, in the right field (the field favored by the
left hemisphere).
234 This confirms a more even distribu-
tion of “concern” in the right hemisphere than in the left,
consonant with the well-known phenomenon of hemi-
neglect following right-hemisphere insult, but going fur-
ther. Having a “utilization bias” in favor of the left hemi-
sphere intensifies this effect, whereas having a similar
bias in favor of the right hemisphere does not. 
Furthermore, in the majority of normal subjects transfer
of information from left hemisphere to right hemisphere
takes place more slowly than transfer from right to
left,
235-237 even where the task is by nature better suited to
the right hemisphere.
238 Interhemispheric competition is
also revealed by response to injury. In 1890, Brown-
Séquard found he was able to reverse a paralysis caused
by a lesion in one hemisphere of a frog by inflicting a
similar lesion at the same point in the contralateral
hemisphere.
239 In accordance with this, if, following a
brain injury, the contralateral hemisphere is disabled
temporarily by transcranial magnetic stimulation, an
improvement in function in the damaged hemisphere
results.
240,241 Similarly, a subsequent insult to the con-
tralateral hemisphere yields an improvement in function
in the originally damaged hemisphere.
242 But such inter-
hemispheric competition appears again to be asymmet-
rical, with the suppressive effect of the left hemisphere
on the right being greater than that of the right on the
left.
240,243 Moreover, in chicks there is an asymmetry in
favor of the right hemisphere, but when the commissures
develop in adult birds, this permits the left hemisphere
to have an inhibitory effect on the right hemisphere to a
greater extent than the right hemisphere has on the left;
severing of the commissures re-establishes the primary
asymmetry.
4,244
Finally there may be costs as well as benefits to mutual
inhibition, as callosotomy subjects reveal. Though they
have handicaps, they can carry out some tasks more
swiftly than normal subjects.
245 For example, tasks involv-
ing focused attention usually engage primarily the left
hemisphere. But in split-brain patients, the left hemi-
sphere cannot so effectively inhibit the right, so that both
are able to bring focused attention to bear (the right
hemisphere can also yield focused attention), and both
contribute, with the result that the task is carried out in
half the time. 
Conclusion
One possible explanation of the asymmetry and differ-
ential development of the cerebral hemispheres lies in
the need to apply simultaneously mutually incompatible
modes of attention to the world. This difference in atten-
tion can account for a wide range of so-called hemi-
sphere specializations, and is facilitated by a corpus cal-
losum which is able to balance facilitatory against
inhibitory transmission. There is also an asymmetry in
the way in which the two hemispheres mutually inhibit
one another’s contribution to the phenomenological
world which favors the left hemisphere.  ❏
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